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WASHINGTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT  
TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES: 
Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest 
Deborah Perluss1 
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were 
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and 
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a 
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due 
process in the constitutional sense.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Powell v. 
Alabama,3 involving eight young African American boys.  The boys had 
been convicted of the rape of two white girls and sentenced to death by an 
all white jury in Scottsboro, Alabama.  The case became known famously 
as the Scottsboro Boys Case.  The case was called to trial just six days after 
the indictments were issued.  Upon separate consolidated petitions for 
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether, on 
the basis of the record before the court, the defendants were denied the right 
to counsel.  The Court further asked, if the boys’ right to counsel was in fact 
denied, does such denial violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?4 
In reversing the convictions, the Court determined that under the 
circumstances, the right to appointed counsel was compelled as a matter of 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.5  Importantly, the Court did 
not rest its decision on the dictates of the Sixth Amendment, which 
expressly guarantees a right to counsel to persons charged with crimes in 
federal cases.  It took another thirty-one years before the guaranty of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all criminal cases was extended to the 
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  That occurred, of course, in 
Gideon v. Wainwright,6 a case involving an indigent criminal defendant 
convicted in a Florida court of felony breaking and entering and sentenced 
to five years in prison.  The fortieth anniversary of Gideon was recently 
celebrated. 
In the years between Powell and Gideon, the Court affirmatively 
determined that the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant in all 
circumstances is not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and, thus, is 
not required as a matter of due process in state criminal proceedings.7  
Rather, the Court relied upon the proposition and firm understanding set out 
in Powell and corollary state court precedent that “[e]very court has power, 
if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be 
required in the interest of fairness”8 regardless of the lack of a specific 
textual right set out in the Constitution or by statute. 
Only subsequent to Gideon did the Court begin to read into the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments a conditional right to counsel based on the extent 
to which a criminal defendant risks deprivation of physical liberty.9  That 
limitation became firmly ensconced in constitutional jurisprudence when 
the Court introduced the presumption that counsel is required as a matter of 
fundamental fairness only when the litigant may lose his or her physical 
liberty as an outcome of the case.10 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, a five-to-
four decision, the Court rested the newly announced presumption on the 
remarkable observation that “it is the defendant’s interest in personal 
freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed 
counsel.”11  This, the Court asserted, is demonstrated by the earlier ruling in 
In re Gault,12 in which the Court declared that children faced with juvenile 
court delinquency proceedings are entitled to appointed counsel even 
though such proceedings are generally considered civil rather than criminal 
in nature.  In Lassiter, the Court rested its decision on the statement in 
Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest   573 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 2 • 2004 
Gault that “‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in 
commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed,’ 
the juvenile has a right to appointed counsel even though the proceedings 
may be styled ‘civil’ and not ‘criminal.’”13 
Lassiter was an abrupt shift away from the Court’s analysis of whether to 
appoint counsel for indigents as a matter of fundamental fairness in any 
case, criminal or civil,14 based on consideration of the totality of 
circumstances.  Instead, Lassiter superimposed a presumption against the 
need for counsel if the litigant stands no risk of loss of personal freedom,15 
based on the due process balancing test set out in Matthews v. Eldridge.16  
After Lassiter, regardless of how grave the private interest at stake, how 
limited the governmental interest, and how significant the risk of erroneous 
deprivation is likely to be, in applying the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the presumption against appointed counsel for an 
indigent in a proceeding not likely to result in loss of personal liberty will 
necessarily carry the day. 
This article argues that, notwithstanding the Lassiter presumption against 
appointed counsel for indigent litigants in civil cases when there is no risk 
of incarceration under the federal due process standard, the Washington 
State Constitution compels a different, more flexible approach.  That 
approach rests on the fundamental right of access to justice, which inheres 
in the Washington Constitution.  The fundamental right of access to justice 
requires a court to consider, as a matter of fairness and justice, the litigant’s 
ability to negotiate the system of justice in which he or she is found.  This 
approach borrows from the early right-to-counsel cases, including Powell v. 
Alabama, and the courts’ concern for fairness and justice in the particular 
proceedings.  In contrast, the recent articulation of the due process standards 
under Matthews v. Eldridge and Lassiter look to the “interests” at stake to 
determine the level of “process” due, including whether counsel is required 
to protect those interests. 
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This article demonstrates that the Washington Constitution affords 
greater protection for the right to counsel in civil proceedings than the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  This article also shows that in order to give full 
credence to the Washington Constitution, the Washington courts must 
abjure from applying the “interest-based” Lassiter presumption in favor of a 
more functional “access-based” analysis of when appointed counsel is 
required to ensure meaningful access to justice.  While a court’s tendency 
might be to view such renunciation of Lassiter as either paving an 
untraveled road or straying into judicial activism, the ability of courts to 
exercise their authority to appoint counsel whenever necessary to ensure 
access to justice and fundamental fairness is in fact a return to the basic 
traditions of our system of justice. 
The source of the right to counsel in civil proceedings under the 
Washington Constitution may be founded on the fundamentality of access 
to the courts as a central precept of access to justice.  Unlike the decision in 
Lassiter and other federal right-to-counsel cases, the constitutional 
provisions available to the Washington courts are not limited to due process 
and equal protection.  Rather, the structure and text of the Washington 
Constitution speaks more to the principles of fairness and justice and the 
government’s obligation to secure individual rights contained within the 
state constitution.  A close reading of the Washington Constitution reveals 
that a Washington court has the inherent power to appoint counsel for civil 
litigants whenever, as stated in Powell v. Alabama, “it deems proper to 
appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of 
fairness.”17 
This article further demonstrates that application of the federal due 
process standards, without consideration of the access-to-justice based 
principles embedded in the Washington Constitution, is both fundamentally 
unfair and inconsistent with Washington’s constitutional framework.  
Indeed, the Washington Constitution compels the appointment of counsel at 
public expense whenever a court deems it necessary to secure an indigent 
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litigant’s effective access to the state court system through which the 
administration of justice is entrusted. 
II.  NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES 
In October 2003, the Washington Supreme Court’s Task Force on Civil 
Equal Justice Funding issued a report on the results of a ground-breaking 
study that assessed the civil legal needs of Washington’s poor (the Civil 
Legal Needs Study).18  The Civil Legal Needs Study concluded that 
approximately 75 percent of all low-income households in Washington 
State experience at least one civil legal problem per year.19  The study 
further concluded that low-income people face 88 percent of their problems 
without attorney assistance.20  Moreover, the study found that most legal 
problems experienced by low-income people affect basic human needs such 
as housing, family safety and security, and public safety.21  Finally, while 
no surprise, the study confirms that low-income people who get legal 
assistance experience better outcomes and have greater respect and 
confidence in the justice system than those who do not.22  The findings of 
the legal needs study lead to the inescapable conclusion that a significant 
number of poor persons in Washington unnecessarily suffer the adverse 
social consequences of homelessness, family violence, family instability, 
and inadequate public safety solely because they lack access to competent 
legal counsel. 
In order to partially address many of the legal needs documented in the 
Civil Legal Needs Study, Washington has taken a number of remedial 
measures.  For example, non-lawyer facilitators, based in county 
courthouses, are authorized by statute23 and court rule24 to provide 
assistance to unrepresented domestic relations case litigants.  This includes, 
among other activities, assistance in completion of mandatory court forms; 
assistance in calculating proposed child support; selection, and distribution 
of court forms; explanation of legal terms; information on basic court 
procedures and logistics such as requirements for service and filing of 
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pleadings, scheduling hearings, and complying with local procedures; 
previewing documents to be presented to a judge prior to presentation; 
attendance at hearings to assist the court with pro se matters; and assistance 
with preparation of court orders under the court’s direction.  However, 
many low-income persons are unable to access these resources because of 
insufficient education and literacy, limited English skills, or other factors 
such as mental and physical disabilities.  Also, facilitator resources are 
unavailable for unrepresented litigants in cases outside the scope of 
domestic relations. 
Washington also provides limited funding to staffed civil legal services 
programs that take high-priority needs cases for eligible clients within 
certain substantive law areas, subject to several restrictions.25  In addition, 
virtually every county operates an organized volunteer lawyer program that 
provides free legal services to indigent people.  Even with these resources, 
however, the Civil Legal Needs Study demonstrates that fewer than one in 
five low-income persons are able to obtain the legal services they need to 
secure or protect significant rights. 
Thus, the question to be addressed here is whether in order to advance the 
cause of justice, reduce the social and financial costs of adverse conditions 
such as homelessness and family violence, and instill confidence and trust 
in the justice system, a right to counsel exists in any civil case not likely to 
result in incarceration.  The jurisprudential question is twofold: (1) whether 
there is any basis in the history of federal constitutional jurisprudence for 
the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the holding of Lassiter, and (2) 
whether there is any rationale for states applying their own constitutional 
frameworks to deviate from the approach required by Lassiter. 
Certainly, in answer to the first question, there is always the possibility of 
the U.S. Supreme Court changing course and overruling precedent, as it has 
done many times,26 such as in Gideon v. Wainwright.27  However, the 
balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge has taken hold in other contexts, 
including lower court determinations of what process is due in non-criminal 
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cases.28  Since the way due process is articulated in Matthews and its 
progeny is neither particularly nefarious nor a source of judicial angst,29 
there seems little momentum at this point either within the courts or among 
the advocate community to challenge the Lassiter presumption. 
On the other hand, the development of state constitutional jurisprudence 
provides some hope that state courts will, in the application of their own 
state constitutions and due process requirements, look to other principles 
found within their municipal jurisprudence.  Thus, they may begin to 
construct a framework for analyzing when counsel should be appointed for 
indigent persons based on state constitutional principles separate and apart 
from those set out in Lassiter.30  The development of state jurisprudence on 
the right to counsel under state constitutional provisions is a logical 
extension of the Washington state courts’ recent reliance on state 
constitutional law to recognize the existence of broader individual rights 
and protections than those enjoyed under the federal Constitution.31 
III.  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON 
In Washington, the right to counsel is a product of case law, not 
constitutional or statutory text.  None of the cases in which the Washington 
Supreme Court has established a right to counsel have specifically rested 
upon any provision of the Washington Constitution expressly affording a 
right to counsel—because no such provision exists.  Even in the criminal 
context, the Washington Supreme Court observed that either the U.S. 
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel “inheres” in Article 1, 
Sec. 22 of the Washington Constitution (a criminal defendant shall have the 
right to appear in person or by counsel32), or the right has been adopted by 
court rule.33 
In the civil context, the Washington Supreme Court has predominantly 
relied on rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in determining when due 
process requires an indigent to be appointed counsel.34  But unlike the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court had determined prior to 
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Lassiter that indigent parents in dependency actions brought by the state to 
permanently or temporarily deprive parental rights have a due process right 
to counsel at public expense.35  Those cases rest on the Washington State 
Court’s conclusion that the parent-child relationship is so rooted in the 
“traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”36  
In reaching this conclusion, the court reached back to the common law 
recognition that a parent’s interest in the custody and control of minor 
children was a “sacred” right.37 
Until 1975, the Washington Supreme Court was more concerned with the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings than with whether the case was 
denominated “civil” or “criminal.”  Because the scope of its analysis in the 
right-to-counsel cases encompassed only principles of due process and 
equal protection (which focus on the interests at stake), these cases also 
rested upon an interest-based approach.  But in the early right-to-counsel 
cases, the Washington Supreme Court did not strictly limit the scope of the 
right in civil proceedings, under either the federal or state due process 
standards, to cases involving a high risk of incarceration.  Nor did the 
Washington Supreme Court draw the distinction between civil and criminal 
when fundamental rights of liberty and parental rights were involved.38  
Instead, the Washington Supreme Court had relied on the proposition that 
“where the individual’s right to remain unconditionally at liberty is not at 
issue . . . the right to counsel turns on the particular nature of the 
proceedings and questions involved.”39 
The Washington Supreme Court had also determined that a right to 
counsel exists in proceedings designated as “civil” as a matter of federal 
equal protection.  In Honore v. State Board of Prison Terms,40 the court 
held that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
an indigent state prisoner seeking “civil” habeas corpus relief is entitled to 
appointed counsel to assist in prosecuting his petition at the initial hearing 
stage and on appeal.  This right is afforded when the petition is urged in 
good faith, raises significant issues, and the nature of the issues raised 
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“indicate the necessity for professional legal assistance if they are to be 
presented and considered in a fair and meaningful manner.”41  Again, the 
court was concerned with the fairness of the proceedings and did not rely on 
any categorical expression of when the right to counsel attaches. 
This more expansive approach slowed in the 1980s with the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Walker,42 wherein the court for the 
first time affirmatively conditioned the right to counsel on an imminent 
threat of imprisonment.  State v. Walker was somewhat short lived and not 
followed by later courts (because of the intervening decision in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Matthews v. Eldridge).43  However, any tendency 
toward further expansion of the right to counsel under a due process 
analysis came to a screeching halt in 1995 with In re Grove.44  This turn of 
events was the unfortunate result of the misapplication of federal due 
process and right-to-counsel jurisprudence (Matthews v. Eldridge and 
Lassiter in particular).  In an analytical sidestep, Grove also presented an 
overly broad articulation of when a right to counsel exists, which was 
unnecessary to the court’s resolution of the case.45  Thus, the growth and 
development of right-to-counsel jurisprudence in Washington has been 
seriously retarded on the basis of dicta. 
In re Grove concerned a request by three separate litigants in three 
different cases to pursue their appeals from trial court decisions at the 
public’s expense, including the payment for counsel on appeal.  In two of 
the three cases, a right to counsel was expressly granted by statute.  The 
first case concerned an appeal from a juvenile court dependency 
determination in which right to counsel is afforded “at all stages of the 
proceeding.”46  The second case concerned an appeal of an adverse trial 
court finding under the state’s violent sexual predator act, which similarly 
provides for the right to counsel “at all stages of the proceedings.”47  The 
third case involved a claimant who sought public funding of his appeal from 
a denial of workers’ compensation benefits, when concededly he had no 
statutory or constitutional right to counsel. 
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The question in all three cases, as phrased by the court in the combined 
opinion, was not whether each claimant had a right to counsel, but whether 
he had the right to prosecute his appeal solely because he is indigent, 
notwithstanding the existence or absence of a right to counsel.48  Despite the 
very narrow scope of the actual issue presented, the court departed into a 
lengthy discussion of the right-to-counsel cases and cases addressing the 
waiver of court fees for indigent persons.  As a result, the court concluded 
that because there is no right to counsel in workers’ compensation cases, 
there is no right to appeal at the public’s expense.49 
Prior to In re Grove, indigent-fee-waiver cases had never turned on 
whether a right to counsel existed.  Instead, they typically focused on 
procedural access to courts and disparate impacts of court fees and other 
litigation costs on indigent persons.50  Because there was no need for the 
court in Grove to determine whether there is a constitutional right to 
counsel in workers’ compensation cases, the apparent clear line drawn 
between “fundamental rights” and purely “financial interests” as the 
determinant of a right to counsel in civil matters is technically and 
appropriately dicta. 
While the Washington Supreme Court effectively ceased extending the 
right to counsel in civil cases in 1975 with Tetro v. Tetro, none of the later 
cases51 examined the relationship between Washington’s guaranties of due 
process and equal protection and of access to justice.  Moreover, the 
Washington courts have never considered whether recurrence to 
fundamental principles in the interpretation of these provisions requires a 
right to counsel at the public’s expense when it is necessary to insure that 
indigent civil litigants have access to the courts.  In one recent case, 
Miranda v. Sims,52 Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals did 
consider whether the fundamental right of access to the courts for a civil 
litigant included a right to counsel at public expense.  In finding that it did 
not, the court relied on In re Grove.  However, the court did not foreclose 
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the possibility that in an appropriate case, the right of access to the courts 
may indeed require counsel.53 
The Miranda case involved a request of family members to participate 
through appointed counsel in a non-adversarial, investigative inquest to 
obtain “an objective, nonpartisan, and independent opinion” into the cause 
of the decedent’s death.  Indeed, the facts did not present the sort of 
compelling circumstances that would necessarily result in ineffective access 
to justice.  It was “for these reasons,” that the court rejected the family’s 
argument that their right of access to justice required appointed counsel.54  
However, in an opinion concurring in the result of the case, Judge Anne 
Ellington observed:  
the right to access to the courts is fundamental to our system of 
justice.  Indeed, it is the right “conservative of all other rights.”. . .   
Where rights and responsibilities are adjudicated in the absence of 
representation, the results are often unjust.  If representation is 
absent because of a litigant’s poverty, then likely so is justice, and 
for the same reason.55 
IV.  ACCESS TO JUSTICE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN 
WASHINGTON 
Access to justice is a fundamental right in Washington.  The right is 
founded on the text of Article I, Sec. 10 of the Washington Constitution and 
case law.56  Article I, §10 of the Washington Constitution mandates that 
“[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary 
delay.”57  This provision has been repeatedly cited as the source of the 
established right of access to justice.58 
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has on many occasions relied 
on the fundamental role that access to justice plays in a democratic society 
as the basis for significant initiatives it has taken under its role as chief 
protector and promoter of the justice system.  For example, in 1994, the 
Washington Supreme Court established the first statewide Access to Justice 
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(ATJ) Board as an entity of the Washington State Bar Association 
(WSBA).59  The ATJ Board was created for an initial evaluation period of 
two years.  The court order relied upon the fact that “the Washington 
judicial system is founded upon the fundamental principle that the judicial 
system is accessible to all persons, which advancement is of fundamental 
interest to the members of the Washington State Bar Association.”60 
In reauthorizing the ATJ Board as a permanent entity that is to operate 
within the WSBA, the court reiterated the fundamental principle stated 
above and specifically tasked the board to “promote jurisprudential 
understanding of the law relating to the fundamental right of individuals to 
secure meaningful access to the civil justice system.”61  Those who suffer 
disparate treatment or disproportionate access barriers are of particular 
concern to the court and singled out for special attention by the ATJ 
Board.62 
In November 2001, the Washington Supreme Court further 
acknowledged the fundamental right of access to justice by its unanimous 
order creating a task force on civil equal justice funding.63  While the court 
has not to date defined all of the essential components of the fundamental 
right of access to justice, it has identified that a specific purpose of the task 
force will be to “develop an analysis of and rationale for long-term, 
sustained, and permanent state funding for essential legal services for poor 
and vulnerable people in Washington State.”64  Washington’s chief justices 
have also variously used their positions as chief judicial officers of the state 
to speak about the importance of access to justice and the need for indigent 
persons to have representation in civil proceedings.65  Extrajudicial 
comments of justices have been authoritatively cited in support of  
expanded judicial process.66 
Whether the Washington Supreme Court is willing to make the leap from 
expressions of policy and creation of boards and task forces to a binding 
declaration that the right to counsel is an essential component of access to 
justice for indigent civil litigants cannot be predicted with any degree of 
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certainty.  However, if history is any guide at all, one can at least postulate 
that conditions are ripe for the Washington courts to consider the question 
and, in doing so, to reconsider the Lassiter approach, which led to the 
wholly dichotomous (and jurisprudentially insupportable) result in In re 
Grove. 
A re-examination of the right to counsel as an incident of the 
fundamental right of access to justice in Washington effectively must rest 
on a proper interpretation of the Washington Constitution.  In Washington, 
there are multiple provisions of the state constitution that could form the 
basis of a claim that a trial court has the inherent authority to appoint 
counsel for an indigent person in order to ensure that person’s access to 
justice and the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.  In addition to 
Article I, Sec. 10, these provisions include Article I, Sec. 3 (state due 
process guaranty)67 and Article I, Sec. 12 (state privileges and immunities 
prohibition and equal protection guaranty)68 as informed by the mandate of 
Article I, Sec. 32 (recurrence to fundamental principles).69 
Even if no single constitutional provision would provide sufficient basis 
for the proposition that a right to counsel is an incident of access to justice 
in civil proceedings, a court would be hard pressed to determine that such a 
right does not exist at least in some instances of civil litigation.  Article I, 
Sec. 32 of the Washington Constitution has no equivalent in the federal 
constitution; therefore, the recurrence to fundamental principles as a direct 
source of rights or an interpretive tool for analysis of other constitutional 
provisions need not be subjected to the stringent requirements for state 
constitutional interpretation imposed by the seminal case of Gunwall v. 
State.70  But for determining whether the fundamental right of access to 
justice compels Washington courts to consider the need for counsel in civil 
cases beyond the scope allowed by In re Grove, Gunwall offers a useful 
analytical framework.71  On the basis of the Gunwall criteria, there is little 
doubt that the Washington Constitution provides support for the inherent 
judicial authority to appoint counsel to civil litigants. 
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V.  WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 32 
Article I, Sec. 32 of the Washington Constitution provides, “[a] frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of 
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.”72  Article I, Sec. 
32 has been addressed infrequently by the Washington Supreme Court and 
rarely in relation to specific claims of individual right.73  It has been used as 
both an interpretive mechanism for other rights set out in the state 
constitution,74 however, and as a source of substantive rights.75  But, the full 
extent of its application and meaning has not been established.  At 
minimum, based on the express text of the provision, it characterizes the 
fundamental relationship between individual rights and free government.  
This characterization lies at the heart of the Washington Constitution’s 
declaration of rights, finding expression as the first statement of principle.76 
This constitutional mandate further compels “recurrence to fundamental 
principles.”  To “recur” has been defined variously as “to have recourse,” 
“resort,” “to go back in thought or discourse,” “to come up again for 
consideration.”77  “Recurrent” means “running or turning back in a direction 
opposite to a former course.”78  “Fundamental principles” can mean nothing 
less than those principles which, by nature, inhere in all humankind, 
regardless of their expression in documents and texts governing essentially 
political relationships.  In State v. Seely,79 while not unconditionally 
endorsing the view, the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that 
Brian Snure has argued “persuasively” that the phrase “frequent recurrence 
to fundamental principles” “suggests that framers retained the notion that 
natural rights should be considered when protecting individual rights.”80 
Snure’s suggestion is further supported by the court’s recognition that 
when the Washington Constitution was first proposed it contained only 
thirty-one sections in Article I.  As observed by the court, “[s]ection 32 was 
proposed by George Turner, whose later speeches as a U.S. Senator lead to 
the conclusion that Turner, like others of his day, believed that 
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constitutional interpretation often required a return to natural law principles 
beyond the four corners of the constitution.”81 
It is on the supposition that the protections and requirements of the 
Washington Constitution are not limited by the expressed text of the 
document that the Washington Supreme Court found constitutional 
protection for the individual right to contract in 189882 and the individual 
right to an insanity defense to a criminal charge in 1910.83  The court’s 
recurrence to fundamental principles examined the common law treatment 
of property rights and persons of unsound mind.84  However, as 
demonstrated below, the common law is not the extent of sources of law 
regarding fundamental rights and principles that may be recurred in 
defining the scope of access to justice under the Washington Constitution. 
Finally, with the use of the term “frequent,” the constitution’s drafters 
have clearly implored the Washington courts to rely on fundamental 
principles and on sources outside the four corners of the document time and 
again, in order to protect and maintain individual rights and to ensure that 
justice and fairness are achieved. 
VI.  COMMON LAW SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Certainly on the basis of the Washington Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 
one source of fundamental principles grounded in natural law is the 
common law.  It is also a source of law to which the court may recur for the 
right to counsel for indigent civil litigants.  California Court of Appeals 
Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., is a leading commentator on the right to counsel in 
civil proceedings at common law.85  As Justice Johnson has written: 
A rather primitive right to equal justice came to America from 
England along with the rest of our common law legal system.  At 
the time the colonists were settling our nation, this right had 
existed under the common law of England for several hundred 
years.  In 1495, during the reign of Henry VII, the English 
Parliament enacted a statute guaranteeing free counsel and waiving 
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all fees for indigent civil litigants.  This “Statute of Henry VII” 
created a right to free counsel for indigent English litigants and 
empowered the courts to appoint lawyers to provide the 
representation without compensation.86 
English judicial decisions extended this statutory right to courts of 
equity.87  Blackstone cited the statute of 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 as the source of 
the right to counsel in civil proceedings: “[a]nd paupers…are, by 
statute…to have original writs and subpoenas gratis, and counsel and 
attorney assigned them without fee; and are excused from paying costs.”88 
The statute of Henry VII established a right to counsel for indigent civil 
litigants with meritorious claims before the court.  The rationale for 
Parliament’s enactment of the statute was to ensure that indigent civil 
litigants had effective access to the King’s court and was part and parcel of 
the rights that attached to in forma pauperis status; the law itself was 
denominated An Act to Admit Such Persons as Are Poor to Sue in Forma 
Pauperis.89  The purpose of the statute was to ensure that the poor, who had 
been effectively excluded from the King’s courts until then, could access 
the system of justice then in place.90  That “access to justice” was the 
fundamental principle underlying the common law requirement of 
counsel—and not the desire to protect an underlying fundamental right or 
interest such as liberty or family relationship—is evident91 first, from the 
fact that the right initially applied only to civil plaintiffs92 and second, from 
the fact that it was the complexity of the legal system itself and the inability 
of the poor to hire expert legal assistance that the statute sought to redress.93  
Moreover, the only factor considered in appointing counsel was the 
litigant’s indigence; the nature of the action or the rights to be enforced was 
irrelevant.94  Once a litigant was determined to be indigent, appointment of 
counsel was mandatory.  The right to appointed counsel in civil actions was 
extended to indigent civil defendants by English courts as a matter of 
common law applying the same rationale underlying the statute.95 
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The statute of Henry VII remained in effect in England until 1883.  It was 
subsequently replaced by a system of legal aid for paupers administered 
under the Rules of Court.96  The fundamental value of access to the courts 
and the importance of legal assistance for the poor as a core element of fair 
judicial proceedings was carried to the American colonies by the English97 
and continues to find expression in contemporary judicial decisions.98 
VII.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES 
International Law or the Law of Nations and, in particular, international 
human rights law embody those principles that civilized nations have 
deemed fundamental.  It is another source of applicable law “beyond the 
four corners” of the constitution to which Washington courts may recur 
under Article I, Sec. 32 to find a right to appointed counsel when required 
to ensure access to the courts.99 
Over 100 years ago, in a case called The Paquete Habana,100 the United 
States Supreme Court declared the duty of a court to apply International 
Law “as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
their determination.”101  Washington courts have not shied away from this 
admonition and have referenced international law and international human 
rights law when important questions of constitutional interpretation have 
been presented.  For example, in Eggert, et. al. v. City of Seattle,102 the 
Washington Supreme Court relied in part on Article 13, Sec. 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights103 as a source for finding an 
unwritten constitutional right to travel, which the court determined was 
violated by a durational residency requirement for civil service 
employment.104  The court further cited the Magna Carta’s proclamation 
“allowing every free man to leave England except during wars,” and the 
historical growth of this right having in part resulted from “efforts to evade 
restrictions imposed by feudal apprenticeship and paupership laws in 17th 
century England.”105 
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In addition to Great Britain, from which the common law right to counsel 
in civil cases originates, other western democratic countries have 
recognized a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases either as an 
incident of “equal protection before the law” or as an affirmative obligation 
to provide equal access to justice for low-income citizens.106  For example, 
“France and Germany have provided counsel for the indigent since the 
1870s.”107  As reported by Justice Johnson, 
Germany has a comprehensive statutory right to counsel in civil 
cases heard in the regular courts.  Nonetheless, the German 
Constitutional Court has also made it clear the nation’s 
constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing in civil cases requires 
appointment of free counsel for poor people where the legal aid 
statute does not.108 
In 1937, the Federal Court of Switzerland, that country’s highest court, 
held that the Swiss Constitution guarantees that its citizens are “equal 
before the law” and requires the governments of the Swiss Cantons to 
provide free lawyers to indigent litigants in all civil cases which require 
knowledge of the law.109  In that case, the Swiss court observed that “poor 
people could not be ‘equal before the law’ in the regular courts unless they 
had lawyers just like the rest of the citizenry.”110 
Justice Johnson cites numerous other examples of jurisdictions that have 
recognized the fundamentality of the right to legal representation for the 
poor in civil proceedings as an incident of equal access to the courts.111  
However, the broadest and most significant recognition of the fundamental 
obligation of government to provide free legal assistance to indigent civil 
litigants occurred in 1979, when the right was extended throughout the 
European Community by the European Court of Human Rights’ 
interpretation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
the case of Airey v. Ireland.112  Importantly, Airey does not rest on the 
guaranty of non-discrimination or equal protection under the law, but rather 
on the fundamental notion of access to justice. 
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Similar to the Washington Constitution’s Article I, Sec. 10 guaranty of 
the fair administration of justice, Article 6 of the European Convention 
reads, “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time.”113  On the basis of this provision, the European 
Court held in Airey that a low-income Irish woman had a protected human 
right to counsel as a matter of “fair” access to justice when she sought a 
judicial separation from her husband.114 
The Irish Government argued in the case that because Ms. Airey’s 
personal circumstances created the barrier to her ability to access justice, 
rather than any impediment posed by the state, the government had no duty 
to remove the barrier.115  Importantly, the European Court rejected that 
argument and ruled that “fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on 
occasion necessitates some positive action on the part of the State; in such 
circumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive. . . .  The obligation 
to secure an effective right of access to the courts falls into this category of 
duty.”116  The court emphasized, however, that free counsel for poor 
persons is not necessarily required in all forums, but that governments can 
satisfy the duty by establishing forums which are simple enough in both 
procedure and substantive law to allow citizens to have a fair hearing 
without the assistance of a lawyer.117 
Significantly, while Airey was pending before the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
adopted a resolution declaring that the right of access to justice and a fair 
hearing includes the right to free legal aid and proceedings when necessary 
to ensure that no one is “prevented by economic obstacles from pursuing or 
defending his right before any court determining civil, commercial, 
administrative, social, or fiscal matters.”118 
Hence, in the international arena, not only does the right of access to 
justice include effective access, but government also has an affirmative duty 
to secure the right to individuals.  The government can do so either by 
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appointing legal counsel for indigent litigants or by simplifying the forums 
in which justice is administered to allow lay citizens a fair hearing without 
the assistance of counsel.119  In many cases, however, such as for 
individuals who may have difficulties communicating with the justice 
system due to mental health problems or lack of English language 
proficiency, direct legal assistance is essential to secure access to the courts.  
Again, as was the case with the common law requirement, it is the 
complexity of the law and procedure that provokes the right to counsel and 
not the quality or “fundamentalness” of the rights or interests at issue in the 
proceeding. 
VIII.  APPLYING THESE SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO 
WASHINGTON’S ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 
In applying both the common law and international law sources of 
fundamental principles to interpreting the scope of Article I, Sec. 10 of the 
Washington Constitution, it is apparent that this clause contemplates a right 
to counsel for civil litigants as part and parcel of access to justice.  It is 
equally apparent that, when viewed with reference to access to justice, the 
rationale of the Washington Supreme Court’s most recent examination of 
the question in In re Grove is not sustainable. 
Using the Gunwall criteria (the text and structure of the state constitution, 
state constitutional law history, pre-existing state law, and matters of 
particular state interest)120 to examine the text of the Washington 
Constitution, there is no rationale for distinguishing liberty from property or 
financial interests in evaluating a litigant’s need to access the courts for a 
determination of his or her important personal interests.  For example, the 
text of Article I, Sec. 3 (due process guaranty) does not distinguish between 
the level of process that is due to protect life, liberty, and property—each is 
placed on equal footing.  Indeed, in recurring to fundamental principles in 
Dennis v. Moses, the Washington Supreme Court drew no distinction and 
found that the challenged restriction on the free use of property to secure a 
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loan was the equivalent of a deprivation of liberty.121  One might argue that 
the Washington Constitution affords certain property interests, such as the 
home, greater recognition and, therefore, greater procedural protection than 
other property or financial interests.122  But In re Grove cuts a wider swath 
and includes all property interests in the presumption against a right to 
counsel in civil matters. 
The cases interpreting Article I, Sec. 10 correspondingly underscore the 
importance of due process protections in this state—not just to protect 
interests in life, liberty, and property, but also to secure the fair 
administration of justice.  Indeed, the Washington courts have deemed the 
assistance of counsel to be an essential component of the fair administration 
of justice.  For example, in Honore v. State Bd. of Prisons, the Washington 
State Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of appointed counsel 
expressly did not rest on the civil nature of the proceedings (post conviction 
habeas corpus), but on the lack of fairness in the proceedings in the absence 
of counsel as a matter of equal protection.123  And also, in In re Myricks, the 
need for counsel to protect the fundamental familial rights at stake was to 
ensure the fair administration of justice.  The court explicitly stated:  
In dependency and child neglect proceedings—even if only 
preliminary to later and more final pronouncements—the indigent 
parent has to face the superior power of the State resources.  The 
panoply of the traditional weapons of the State are trained on the 
defendant-parent, who often lacks formal education and with 
difficulty must present his or her version of disputed facts; match 
wits with social workers, counselors, psychologists, physicians, 
and often an adverse attorney; cross-examine (often expert 
witnesses) under rules of evidence and procedure of which he or 
she usually knows nothing; deal with documentary evidence he or 
she may not understand, and all to be done in the strange and 
awesome setting of the juvenile court.124 
The Washington right-to-counsel cases125 provide the guidance as to 
some of the essential factors for determining when counsel is needed to 
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ensure access to the justice system.  These include: first, the imbalance of 
power between the parties, for example, a state party litigant represented by 
counsel and an unsophisticated litigant unschooled in the procedural rules 
of litigation; second, the actual unfairness and the appearance of unfairness 
for poor and uneducated litigants to “match wits” with expert witnesses; 
third, the need for cross-examination or documentary evidence and the 
corresponding complexity of evidentiary requirements related to their 
admissibility; and fourth, the nature and formality of the court setting and 
the relative comfort level of the litigant appearing in court.  On the basis of 
In re Myricks, Honore, In re Luscier, and the other pre-In re Grove right to 
counsel cases, the Washington State constitutional law history criterion of 
Gunwall supports a different, more functional approach to the determination 
of when counsel is required in state civil cases than what the federal 
constitution dictates. 
Washington also has a demonstrated history of particular interest in 
access to justice and the need for legal services for the poor.  For example, 
as early as 1939 the Washington Legislature recognized the importance of 
civil legal aid for the poor in the Legal Aid Act,126 which authorized 
counties to organize and fund civil legal aid programs.  In so doing, the 
Legislature declared “[t]he promotion of legal aid . . . to be in the public 
interest.”127  The Washington Legislature has further declared as a matter of 
legislative policy that “effective legal representation should be provided for 
indigent persons and persons who are indigent and able to contribute, 
consistent with the constitutional requirements of fairness, equal protection, 
and due process in all cases where the right to counsel attaches.”128 
Washington has been at the forefront of more recent national efforts to 
promote access to justice for the poor.  In addition to the various 
Washington Supreme Court initiatives cited above,129 the Washington State 
Bar Association (WSBA) has also made access to the civil justice system 
for poor persons a high priority for its attention.  One example is a WSBA 
resolution of June 28, 2000, finding that “there exists a crisis in the 
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availability of civil equal justice services for vulnerable low-income people 
in Washington State.”130 
In addition, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Washington Constitution 
reflects particular concern for protecting the interests of the poor.  Not only 
does Article I, Sec. 17131 forbid imprisonment for debt, but Article VIII, 
Sec. 7 prohibits any governmental extension of credit, “except for the 
necessary support of the poor and infirm.”132  Thus, Washington’s particular 
interest in access to justice for the poor finds expression in both law and 
policy at many levels of the justice system. 
Assuming a right of access to the courts is fundamental, and assuming 
further that the Washington Constitution’s guaranty of access to justice 
requires appointment of counsel for indigent litigants in some civil cases, 
must the government satisfy that obligation?  The text of the Washington 
Constitution answers this question in the affirmative. 
Unlike the federal Bill of Rights, which imposes negative constraints on 
the federal and state governments,133 the Washington Constitution contains 
an affirmative declaration of rights.  The very first article of the Washington 
Constitution is the Declaration of Rights, and the express language of the 
very first provision declares that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the 
people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.”134  
This provision, along with Article I, Sec. 10 (access to justice) and Article I, 
Sec. 32 (recurrence to fundamental principles), are mandatory by the 
express terms of Article I, Sec. 29 of the Washington Constitution, which 
reads: “[t]he provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by 
express words they are declared to be otherwise.”135 
The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, Sec. 29 as a 
directive to the state as a whole to secure the protections of the 
constitution,136 but that in the realm of individual rights enumerated in the 
constitution, it was recognized that “the courts have ample power, and will 
go to any length, within the limits of judicial procedure, to protect such 
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constitutional guaranties” (emphasis added).137  Article I, Sec. 10 has been 
expressly identified as one of those constitutional guaranties that the courts 
have ample power to judicially enforce, even in the absence of 
implementing legislation.138  Thus, even in the absence of legislation that 
affirmatively requires appointment of counsel in civil cases when necessary 
to secure access to justice, Washington courts have the inherent 
constitutional power and authority to appoint counsel and as a constitutional 
mandate must do so.  Therefore, applying the Gunwall criteria of significant 
differences in text and structure of the federal and state constitutions, it is 
apparent that there is a strong basis for finding a right to counsel in civil 
matters beyond the scope of the federal constitution as determined by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Lassiter.139 
Thus, the question boils down to: when should a court exercise its 
inherent authority to appoint counsel for a civil litigant?  Assuming that a 
categorical approach based either on the likelihood of incarceration or the 
presence of a fundamental liberty interest is not sufficient, what factors 
should a court consider in determining when counsel is necessary to secure 
access to justice in any given case?  While the state’s jurisprudence to date 
has not fully examined these questions, one can glean from the 
jurisprudence certain considerations that must be part of an informed 
court’s assessment in an “access-based” as opposed to a categorical 
“interest-based” analysis of when meaningful or effective access to the 
court is lacking. 
IX.  ACCESS-BASED DETERMINATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL 
Ideally, an access-based determination would enable a trial court to 
survey the totality of circumstances in any case.  The trial court can ask 
itself whether the parties are sufficiently able to present their claims or 
defenses, whether they can coherently present the facts and address matters 
of evidence, and if the court has a sufficient command of the information 
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available to render a fair and just ruling in the case.  Factors related to the 
nature of the case that may affect these considerations are, among others, 
the complexity of the applicable law, the presence of any procedural issues 
that need to be addressed, and the potential existence of cross or counter-
claims that could be lost if not asserted.  The court might also weigh the 
need for expert testimony; the presence of complex evidentiary issues; the 
availability of other forums to resolve the dispute; and the extent of or need 
for pre-trial proceedings, such as preliminary relief, complex discovery, or 
summary judgment motions. 
An access-based analysis would also necessarily enable a court to make 
reasonable determinations about individual litigants’ differing abilities to 
meaningfully participate in the proceedingsparticularly in light of case-
based determinations provoked by the above considerations.  Such 
individualized assessments might include inquiries into the educational 
level of a litigant and the litigant’s familiarity with the court system (e.g., 
lay landlords and debt collection agency owners often initiate eviction or 
debt collection actions and effectively appear in court without counsel).  
Also included within the ambit of an individualized inquiry is whether a 
litigant suffers from a mental disability or emotional impairment that affects 
his or her ability to understand the proceedings or to communicate 
coherently with the court.  The presence of a communication barrier or 
disability that affects the litigant’s ability to participate effectively or 
understand the proceedings is, like the absence of proficiency in the English 
language impairing a litigant’s ability to understand the proceedings or to 
communicate effectively his or her interests to the court, likely to render the 
need for counsel more acute.  Similarly, other vulnerabilities such as 
physical disabilities or frailtyeither of which may make the need for a 
litigant to come to the court a barrier to accessing the justice systemmust 
be considered along with the relative availability of resources to mitigate 
the absence of counsel.  Such alternative resources include qualified 
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language interpreters, courthouse facilitators, domestic violence advocates, 
and technology. 
In addition to the case-based factors and the individualized characteristics 
that a court should assess, there are also systemic issues that should be 
assessed to determine if the presence of counsel is needed to ensure access 
to the courts.  These issues include factors such as the balance of power 
between the partiese.g., a governmental plaintiff represented by publicly 
supplied counsel against an unrepresented person; a young minority litigant 
forced to defend his or her interest in a predominantly white justice system; 
a wealthy relative seeking custody or other impairment of family rights 
from a teenage parent reliant on public benefits programs; a highly abusive 
partner versus a domestic violence victim in a dissolution or custody action; 
a United States citizen suing an undocumented immigrant.  The list can go 
on.  These assessments, either independently or coupled with an assessment 
of the interests at stake, would no doubt demonstrate that at least in some 
civil matters that do not concern physical liberty or governmental 
impairment of fundamental familial rights, meaningful access to the justice 
system compels appointment of counsel. 
A court in the exercise of its inherent authority to secure access to its 
processes must be empowered to make these assessments and to appoint 
counsel at public expense to represent a needy litigant.140  This premise is 
what was contemplated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama.  
Even though the extreme circumstances of that case called out for the 
appointment of counsel, it was ultimately the interest of fairness, given the 
particularized circumstances of the Scottsboro Boys and the systemic and 
institutionalized obstructions to fairness that so offended the Court’s 
sensitivities and compelled the outcome.141 
Though admittedly the potential outcome in civil matters can never be 
considered as extreme as the execution of a defendant charged with a capital 
offense, federal cases Gideon v. Wainwright and In re Gault provide solid 
proof that the potential for less extreme personal consequences calls out for 
Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest   597 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 2 • 2004 
equally fair treatment.  Even if courts were to continue to rely in part on 
interest-based determinations of when the right to counsel exists in civil 
matters, it is unreasonable to draw the interests as narrowly as that drawn in 
Washington’s In re Grove. 
The stigmatizing public nature of proceedings impairs important personal 
interests not unlike the long-lasting effects of the delinquency finding that 
concerned the court in In re Gault.142  These proceedings can include 
evictions, debt collections, domestic violence, and custody disputes, among 
others.  Evictions from government-assisted housing prevent the evicted 
tenants from again accessing the public housing programs and ultimately 
impair the tenant’s ability to secure substitute housing.  Debt collection 
actions color credit reports, often impairing the debtor’s ability to obtain 
future loans.  Other actions can have similar far-reaching, long-term 
ramifications.  Hence, it is not that far of a leap from the spectrum of 
adverse consequences flowing from a criminal prosecution to the very 
serious and sometimes devastating consequences that can result from civil 
litigation.  Regardless of the potential consequences, however, the extent of 
the likely deprivation should not be the sole determinant of fair access to the 
system—the system charged with the consequence-inducing decision-
making process. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Proponents of a fair and just society should no longer need to ask whether 
a right to counsel for non-criminal litigants finds support in the fundamental 
precepts of a modern civilized societysuch support exists within and 
among the historical documents and foundational principles on which they 
restat least in Washington. 
Courts in Washington are mandated to look back to natural law and other 
sources “beyond the four corners” of the constitution to ensure that the 
fundamental individual right of access to the courts is guaranteed.  Courts 
have the inherent constitutional authority to enforce this right and one 
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significant mechanism for enforcement is the appointment of counsel when 
the totality of the circumstances deems it to be necessary to secure access 
for a party litigant.  The access-based approach to a review of when 
appointment of counsel is necessary takes into account both systemic and 
individualized conditions.  In contrast to the access-based analysis, a 
categorical interest-based right to counsel at best renders the system of 
justice that is central to a democratic social order non-user friendly.  At 
worst, it threatens the very legitimacy and relevance of the system that is 
essential to the preservation of the constitutional framework.  It is time to 
recur again. 
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counsel in misdemeanor cases established by Court Rule implementing ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice). 
34 See, e.g., In re Lewis, 564 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1977) (right to counsel in juvenile 
court declination hearing is of federal constitutional magnitude), citing Kent v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966), overruled by In re Grove, 897  P.2d 1252, 1260 (Wash. 
1995) to the limited extent inconsistent with the holding that a litigant entitled to counsel 
at all stages of a proceeding is entitled by statute to counsel on appeal. 
35 See also In re Luscier, 524 P.2d 906, 909 (Wash. 1974) (permanent deprivation of 
parental rights by the state requires appointment of counsel for indigent parent); In re 
Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 842 (Wash. 1975) (extending Luscier to temporary deprivation of 
parental rights proceedings). 
36 In re Myricks, 533 P.2d at 842 (citing Snyder v. Masachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)). 
37 See Luscier, 524 P.2d at 908 (citing In re Hudson,  126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942)). 
38 Id.  See also Tetro,  544 P.2d 17. 
39 Id.  See also In re Adoption of Hernandez, 607 P.2d 879 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (no 
right to counsel for birth parent who voluntarily relinquished her child in non-adversarial 
adoption proceeding); James,  686 P.2d at1099 (decision to appoint counsel for indigent 
putative father in state-initiated paternity action is best made by the trial court). 
40 Honore v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 466 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1970). 
41 Id. at 493. 
42 State v. Walker, 553 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1976) (finding no right to counsel in filiation 
(paternity) proceedings when there is no imminent direct threat of imprisonment). 
43 See id.; Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
44 Grove, 897 P.2d 1252. 
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45 Id. at 1256–59. 
46 Id. at 1255 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090 (2003)). 
47 Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050 (2003)). 
48 See id. at 1255. 
49 Id. at 1261 (“Where, as here, the interest at stake is only a financial one, the right 
which is threatened is not considered ‘fundamental’ in a constitutional sense.”). 
50 See O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 458 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1969); Ashley v. Super. Ct. of 
Pierce County, 509 P.2d 751 (Wash. 1973); Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, 517 P.2d 
197 (Wash. 1973); Bullock v. King County Super. Ct., 524 P.2d 385 (Wash. 1974); 
Housing Auth. of King County v. Saylors, 557 P.2d 321 (Wash. 1977); and cases cited 
therein. 
51 See, e.g., In re Perkins, 969 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the 
interest based federal due process standards and finding that no fundamental liberty 
interest is at stake in an initial truancy proceeding, where the alleged truant is potentially 
subject to an order requiring him to attend school; change schools; or appear before a 
community truancy board, whose role is to help abate the truancy).  See also cases cited 
in Luscier, 524 P.2d 906; Myricks, 533 P.2d 841. 
52 Miranda v. Sims, 991 P.2d 681, 683–84 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 684. 
55 Id. at 687 (quoting Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)). 
56 See, e.g., Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 375 (Wash. 1991) (reciting a 
history of the Court’s cases establishing a right of “access to justice,” relying variously 
on Article I, §§ 1, 10, and 32, relating to the jurisdiction and authority of superior courts); 
King v. Olympic Pipeline, 16 P.3d 45, 57 (Wash. 2000).  See also 1519–1525 Lakeview 
Blvd. Condo. Assn. v. Apartment Sales Corp., 6 P.3d 74, 80–81 (Wash. 2000). 
57 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
58 Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d at 375. 
59 In the Matter of the Appointments to the Access to Justice Bd., No. 25700-B-277 
(Wash. Oct. 19, 1994). 




63 In the Matter of the Appointments to the Access to Justice Bd., No. 25700-B-412, 
(Wash. Nov. 1, 2001). 
64 Id.  Paragraph VI of the Supreme Court’s Order Creating the Task Force on Civil 
Equal Justice Funding specifies the purposes of the Task Force shall be to: 
(A) Oversee a comprehensive study of the unmet civil legal needs of the poor 
and vulnerable people in Washington State, including the unmet needs of those 
who suffer from disparate access barriers; 
(B) Develop an analysis of and rationale for long-term, sustained, and 
permanent state funding for essential legal services for poor and vulnerable 
people in Washington State; 
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(C) Establish an appropriate level of funding for state supported civil legal 
services needed to address identified unmet civil legal needs of poor and 
vulnerable people in Washington State; 
(D) Identify and propose strategies to secure long-term, sustained, and 
permanent state funding needed to meet this need; and 
(E) Develop recommendations for the proper administration and oversight of 
publicly funded civil equal justice services in Washington State. 
65 E.g. Washington Chief Justice Gerry Alexander, Address at the University of 
Washington’s School of Law Commencement (June 10, 2001) (text on file with Seattle 
Journal for Social Justice).  Chief Justice Alexander spoke of the importance of access to 
justice as the fundamental precept of democracy. 
66 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31. 
67 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3, provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” 
68 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12, provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, 
class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which 
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” 
69 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32, reads: “A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government.” 
70 Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812–13.  The Washington Supreme Court looks to six non-
exhaustive criteria when analyzing whether the Washington Constitution affords greater 
protection than do parallel provisions of the Federal Constitution, including: (1) the text 
of the state constitution; (2) significant differences in that text and the parallel federal 
constitutional provisions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; (4) pre-
existing state law; (5) differences in the structure between the federal and state 
constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest. 
71 Id. 
72 For an excellent discussion of the historical context for the adoption of this provision, 
see Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individual Rights, 
Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH. L. REV. 669 (1992). 
73 Id. at 677–78. 
74 See, e.g., Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 42 P.3d 394 
(Wash. 2002) (interpreting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12); Southcenter Joint Venture v. 
Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1295 (Wash. 1989) (Justice Utter 
concurring but criticizing the majority’s use of the state action doctrine to deny free 
speech rights under the state constitution); Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d. at 375 
(interpreting rights of discovery as an incident of right of access to the courts under art. I, 
§ 10). 
75 State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (1910) (right to insanity defense); Dennis v. Moses, 52 
P. 333 (1898) (liberty right to contract for debt).  See also Snure, supra note 72, at 679 
n.76 (citing cases that interpret art. I, § 32 as substantive).  Cf., Seely v. State, 940 P.2d 
604 (1997) (finding no right to use marijuana for medical treatment founded on a natural 
right in existence at time of constitution’s adoption). 
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76 “All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain 
individual rights.”  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
77 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 985 (9th ed. 1984). 
78 Id. 
79 940 P.2d at 620. 
80 Id. at 621. 
81 Id. 
82 Dennis, 52 P. at 339. 
83 Strasburg, 110 P. at 1021. 
84 In Dennis, 52 P. at 339, the court looked to Blackstone’s definition of civil liberty as 
reflective of “natural liberty” and Cooley’s discussion of state constitutions as not a 
limiting source of rights, which is “boundless in extent and incapable of definition.” 
85 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, ET AL., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (Vincenzo Varano ed., 1975); Earl 
Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice: Where the United States Stands Two Decades Later, 
5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 199, 204 (1994) [hereinafter Toward Equal Justice]; see 
also Quail v. Mun. Court, 171 Cal. App. 3d 572 (1985) (Johnson, J. concurring and 
dissenting).  Justice Johnson has also written in the previous issue of this journal on right 
to counsel for civil litigants under foreign and international law.  See Earl Johnson, Jr., 
Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 201 (2003). 
86 CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 85 at 204. 
87 See, e.g., id.; Oldfield v. Cobbett, 41 Eng. Rep. 765 (1845). 
88 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, A Facsimile of the First 
Edition of 1765–1769, Vol. III Of Private Wrongs (1768) (1979). 
89 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 Statutes of the Realm 578 (1969).  The statute 
provided, in pertinent part: 
[T]he Justices . . . shall assign to the same poor person or persons, Counsel 
learned by their discretions which shall give their Counsels nothing taking for 
the same, and in likewise the same Justices shall appoint attorney and attorneys 
for the same person and persons and all other officers requisite and necessary 
to be had for the speed of the said suits to be had and made which shall do 
their duties without any rewards for their Counsels, help and business in the 
same (spelling modernized). 
90 John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 366 
(1923). 
91 It was this “right of every Englishman . . . of applying to the courts of justice for 
redress of injuries” as inscribed in the Magna Carta that was held sacred at common law. 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at 137. 
92 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 60–61 (“Originally, in England, a person charged with treason 
or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the 
accused himself might suggest.  At the same time, parties in civil cases and persons 
accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel”). 
93 Maguire, supra note 90, at 373.  As Maguire notes, the statute of 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 
“was meant to carry the poor man through the ins and outs of an action at common law.” 
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94 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at 400. 
95 See, e.g., Wiat v. Farthing, 84 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1668).  Further, the common-law 
practice of assigning counsel when the defendants were indigent was limited to either 
civil or misdemeanor cases.  It was only later that the right was extended to felony 
defendants. Felix Rackow, The Right to Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 
WM. & MARY Q. 1, 4 (1954). 
96 See SETON POLLOCK, LEGAL AID—THE FIRST 25 YEARS 10–13 (1975) (the statutory 
system has been modified over the years, but retains the mandate that indigent civil 
litigants are entitled to appointed counsel); see generally, Joan Mahoney, Green Forms 
and Legal Aid Offices: A History of Publicly Funded Legal Services in Britain and the 
United States, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 223, 226–29 (1998) (thus, the guaranty of 
counsel to civil litigants has continued in English law and tradition for 600 years). 
97 See Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1206–07 
(Utah 1999).  These common law principles are the precursor for the current pro bono 
publico obligation in every lawyer’s oath. 
98 Honore, 466 P.2d at 498–99 (the fundamental requirement of the right to counsel for 
indigent litigants remains the bedrock of a just system of adjudication).  See also 
Miranda, 991 P2d at 687 (Ellington, J. concurring). 
99 Justice Johnson fully explores international law and foreign domestic law sources for 
the right to counsel in non-criminal proceedings in his article: Will Gideon’s Trumpet 
Sound a New Melody?, supra note 85. 
100 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
101 Id. at 700. 
102 See Eggert v. City of Seattle, 505 P.2d 801, 802 (Wash. 1973). 
103 Art. 13 § 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.”  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948). 
104 Eggert, 505 P.2d at 802. 
105 Id. 
106 CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 85, at 206–08.  See also Robert W. Sweet, Civil 
Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 504 (1998); 
supra note 99; Johnson, Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody?, supra note 85. 
107 Sweet, supra note 106, at 504.  See also Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (1985). 
108 CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 85, at 206 (citing BGB sec. 114 (German Code of 
Civil Procedure) & Decision of June 17, 1953 (No. 26), 2 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts 336 (1953)). 
109 Id. at 206. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 210–14. 
112 Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 305 (1979). 
113 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, art. 6, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228. 
114 Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 316. 
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115 Id. at 314. 
116 Id. at 316. 
117 Id. at 317  
118 Legal Aid and Advice: Resolution 78 (8) Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe on 2 March 1978 and Explanatory Memorandum (1978). 
119 Commentators have suggested that traditional and systemic justice system rules and 
practices have erected insurmountable barriers to access by those unschooled in the 
procedural requirements of litigation and that many changes in the institutional roles of 
clerks, judges, and other court personnel could go far to facilitate meaningful access to 
the courts short of the need for counsel for civil litigants.  See Russell Engler, And Justice 
for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators, 
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999). 
120 Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812–13. 
121 Dennis, 52 P. at 339 (“The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require 
that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.”). 
122 The home receives special protection in the Washington Constitution against invasion 
of privacy under art. I, § 7 and against levy from debts in the homestead exemption under 
article 19. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 19. 
123 Honore, 466 P.2d at 493. 
124 In re Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975). 
125  See cases supra at notes 32-36.  While cases addressing waiver of fees such as trial 
court filing fees (O’Connor v. Matzdorf, 458 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1969)), costs of transcripts 
on appeal (Iverson v. Marine Bancorp., 546 P.2d 454 (Wash. 1976)), service by 
publication costs (Ashley v. Super. Ct., 521 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1974)), sheriff service fees 
(Bullock v. Super. Ct., 524 P.2d 385 (Wash. 1974)), and waiver of appellate fees and 
costs (Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 557 P.2d 321, 325 (Wash. 1976) overruling, Carter v. 
Univ. of Wash., 536 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1975)) have bearing on the Washington Supreme 
Court’s access-to-justice jurisprudence, none of these cases rested on art. I, § 10 and in 
none did the Court recur to fundamental principles under art. I, § 32.  Thus, a full 
consideration of the application of these cases is beyond the scope of this article.  
Importantly, however, the cases support the conclusion that Washington courts have 
inherent power and authority to waive their own procedures and fashion remedies 
required to ensure effective access to the courts, and have implications for how a right to 
counsel for civil litigants might be effectively implemented through the exercise of that 
inherent authority. 
126 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 93 § 1. 
127 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 93 § 2. 
128 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.005 (2002). 
129 See supra notes 59–64 and related text. 
130 Washington State Bar Association Board of Governors Resolution, available at 
http://www.wsba.org/atj/publications/bogresolution.htm (last modified Mar. 10, 2004). 
131 Art. I, § 17 provides: “There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of 
absconding debtors.”  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
132 Art. VIII, § 7 provides: “No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall 
hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any 
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individual, association, company, or corporation, except for the necessary support of the 
poor and infirm.” WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.  See Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 557 P.2d 
321, 333–34 (Wash. 1977) (Horowitz, A.J. concurring). 
133 See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 815 (characterizing the federal Constitution as a “grant of 
limited power,” which is true for articles I–III, but not necessarily accurate with regard to 
the Amendments, which constrain the federal government from taking acts that violate 
individual rights declared and characterizing the state constitution as imposing 
“limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the state to do anything not expressly 
forbidden,” which does not reflect the mandatory obligations imposed on the state by the 
Constitution). 
134 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
135 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29. 
136 See Gottstein v. Lister, 153 P. 595 (Wash. 1915). 
137 Id. at 606. 
138 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 86, citing IV Wash.Hist.Q. 281, 286 (1913), 
quoting Theodore L. Stiles, a member of the constitutional convention and one of the first 
justices of the state Supreme Court on principles of state constitutional interpretation and 
the self-executing mandatory nature of the state Declaration of Rights: 
There have been some excellent provisions in the Constitution from which the 
people have had no benefit, because they depend for operation upon action by 
the legislature, and that body has neglected to do its duty in the premises.  
Considering that by section 29 of the first article every direction contained in 
the constitution is mandatory unless expressly declared to be otherwise, it is at 
least surprising that in some instances no attempt has been made whatsoever 
to set these provisions at their legitimate work. 
139 The other Gunwall criteria, which examine pre-existing state law and matters of 
particular state interest, also support a right to counsel in civil cases as an essential 
component of access to justice.  Cases cited at notes 33–36, supra, pre-exist In re Grove 
and strongly suggest the importance of counsel in Washington jurisprudence. 
140 The decision of whether or not to appoint counsel for an indigent civil litigant may 
arguably be considered either a question of law or a question of discretion, and this is 
itself an important question which could affect the standard of review in appeals of such 
decisions.  However, such a question lies beyond the scope of this article. 
141 Specifically, with respect to whether the trial court’s failure to make an effective 
appointment of counsel was the denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Powell Court stated: 
Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other 
circumstances, we need not determine.  All that it is necessary now to decide, 
as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to 
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense 
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of 
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law; . . . Let us suppose the extreme case of a 
prisoner charged with a capital offense, who is deaf and dumb, illiterate, and 
feeble minded, unable to employ counsel, with the whole power of the state 
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arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for the state without the 
assignment of counsel for his defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death.  
Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be little short of judicial 
murder . . . 
287 U.S. 45, 71–72. 
142 See In re Gault 387 U.S. at 24–25.  The Court noted: 
Police departments receive requests for information from the FBI and other 
law-enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, and social service agencies, and 
most of them generally comply.  Private employers word their application 
forms to produce information concerning juvenile arrests and court 
proceedings, and in some jurisdictions information concerning juvenile police 
contacts is furnished to private employers as well as government agencies. 
